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Fig. 1: A motivating example: conceptual representation of
information sharing with synthetic data from two banks. The
data samples here are represented by green smileys and
red frownies, which could represent the good and fraudulent
customers signatures respectively. Banks would benefit to learn
from more fraudulent signatures but cannot share their data.
The open question is what the banks can share to improve
their knowledge of fraudulent users while minimizing the risk
of privacy breaches of their customers.
Abstract—More data is almost always beneficial for analysis
and machine learning tasks. In many realistic situations however,
an enterprise cannot share its data, either to keep a competitive
advantage or to protect the privacy of the data sources, the
enterprise’s clients for example. We propose a method for data
owners to share synthetic or fake versions of their data without
sharing the actual data, nor the parameters of models that
have direct access to the data. The method proposed is based
on the privGAN architecture where local GANs are trained
on their respective data subsets with an extra penalty from
a central discriminator aiming to discriminate the origin of a
given fake sample. We demonstrate that this approach, when
applied to subsets of various sizes, leads to better utility for the
owners than the utility from their real small datasets. The only
shared pieces of information are the parameter updates of the
central discriminator. The privacy is demonstrated with white-
box attacks on the most vulnerable elments of the architecture
and the results are close to random guessing. This method would
apply naturally in a federated learning setting.
Index Terms—Synthetic data, GAN, Privacy, Distributed data,
Federated Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing data without breaching privacy is a common chal-
lenge in many fields because of lengthy approval processes
required to address ethical and privacy requirements. As a
motivating example, one can imagine two banks (or two bank
branches) who would like to build a model to detect fraudulent
handwritten signatures but have too few samples on their own
to train a sufficiently accurate fraudulent behaviour classifi-
cation model. There are many ways to solve this problem;
but the situation can be generally represented by Fig. 1. The
crux of the issue is the exact definition of Shared Information.
Specifically, the two banks have at least the following options
with respect to what is to be shared:
• their data;
• synthetic data generated by a basic Generative Adversar-
ial Network (GAN); or
• access to synthetic samples while the generator is being
trained.
We assume in this paper that the first option is too risky; but
we will keep it as an ideal baseline that we want to be as close
as possible.
A natural method for using data from multiple sources while
keeping data locally is federated learning [1]; but that would
allow data access to model(s) shared among data owners.
One could add a layer of security by creating a synthetic
data either locally or centrally with GANs [2]. For the banks
example, the fraudulent signatures classifier could be trained
on the synthetic data. In their typical implementations [3]–[5],
however, GANs trained with a federated learning framework
necessitate sharing a model that has direct access to the data
owners’ (e.g. the banks) data, which is again a privacy risk.
Our approach studied here is a method that generates local
synthetic samples that comprise characteristics from all data
owners’ data while only sharing a central discriminator that
access synthetic samples. Motivated by real world use cases
such as the banks in Fig. 1, we modified the original privGAN
[6] prescription to create disjoint subsets of varying sizes.
Another notable difference with the original privGAN is the
exclusion of a pre-training of the central discriminator on the
real data since the whole point of this work is to circumvent
the real data access limitations.
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As a proxy for the client signatures, we use the hand written
digits from which we generate synthetic fake digits. Like the
original privGAN, we show that the resulting local synthetic
data are more private than local synthetic data resulting from
local GANs. In order to demonstrate the validity of this
approach, we will consider utility as the classification accuracy
of a model trained on the synthetic digits and evaluated on a
holdout set.
II. RELATED WORKS
Sharing private data or their characteristics has been exten-
sively explored recently. A very natural approach is simply
to generate private synthetic data with Differential Privacy [7]
through GANs based on either differentially private stochastic
gradient descent [8] (e.g [9]) or the PATE [10] (e.g. [11]).
Both approaches suffer from low utility data for a reasonable
degree of privacy. A recent paper trying to address this issue
shows some promise [12].
Another approach is to train a model in a federated learning
setting such that the data never has to be shared; some
examples are FedGAN [5], MD-GAN [4] and [13]. Since it
has been demonstrated that GANs are vulnerable to privacy
attacks [14], various ways have been proposed to provide
better privacy protection. GANs trained on distributed datasets
with differential privacy (e.g. [15] and [16]) suffer from the
same low quality generated samples as centrally trained GANs,
unless they have access to a very large amount of training
data as in this language model application [17]. FedGP [18]
addresses these challenges by training a central generator
while keeping the discriminators and their parameters local.
The privacy protection, however, is obtained through Differ-
ential Average-Case Privacy using ”post-hoc privacy analysis
framework”. Our method allows users to create local synthetic
data sets, and privacy protection naturally arises from the
architecture without post processing steps.
III. PRIVGAN
PrivGAN [6] is an extension of GAN whose development
has lead to notoriously realistic synthetic images. In their
original version, GANs comprise a generator G and a dis-
criminator D playing a two-player game as shown in Fig.
2. The generator aims to create fake samples such that the
discriminator estimates their probability to be real as high as
possible. The discriminator on the other hand, tries to estimate
the probability that a sample is real rather than fake.
PrivGAN was originally designed to protect against mem-
bership inference attacks such as [14]. The architecture com-
prised N GANs trained on their disjoints, independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) subsets with an extra loss from
a central (private) discriminator DP as described in Fig. 3.
The numeric subscripts correspond to the models and data
associated to a given data owner. In the banks example from
Fig. 1, X1 corresponds to Bank 1’s clients’ signatures and
G1-D1 correspond to the GAN’s generator-discriminator pair
trained on those signatures with the extra discriminator DP
shared by both banks. The authors show that their method
Fig. 2: Simple GAN architecture: the generator G aims to
create fake samples Xfake that are indistinguishable from the
real samples Xreal by the discriminator D.
Fig. 3: Original privGAN architecture with N=2 subsets. In
relation to Fig. 1, the shared information corresponds to the
central discriminator DP accessing only the fake samples
during the training.
“minimally affects the quality of downstream samples as
evidenced by the performance on downstream learning tasks
such as classification”. For the banks, the two important things
in this setting are 1) the clients’ signatures never leave the bank
and 2) architecture elements that have direct access to the real
signatures never leave the bank either.
In this paper, we explore the application of the privGAN
architecture on subsets that are different in sizes. Our ex-
ploration will focus on the utility of the synthetic dataset as
a training set for a classification model which we evaluate
on a holdout set from the original data. Our only other
modification of the original method is to skip the pre-training
of the central discriminator DP on real data. This is to limit
real data access to local components. In our bank example
from Fig. 1, that means that the client signatures from Bank
1 are only accessed by the discriminator D1 which itself is
never shared with the other bank. We will see that reducing
Bank 1’s amount of signatures eventually leads to significant
reduction of the utility of the synthetic data even to a point
of uselessness. We will show how Bank 2 could help Bank 1
without compromising it’s client’s privacy.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
In our experiments, we compare the utility and privacy of
the fake data generated with privGAN and the simple (non-
private) GAN. We limit our exploration to two data owners
(e.g. two banks) so the architecture is exactly as depicted in
Fig. 3. As a proxy for the banks’ client hand written signatures,
we use MNIST [19] to demonstrate our approach. MNIST
contains 70,000 (60,000 training samples and 10,000 test
samples) grayscale handwritten digits. It contains a balanced
number of each 10 classes (digits from 0 to 9) of 28x28
images. We vary both training subsets in size to cover various
scenarios and are referred to as a fraction of the total subset.
For examples, we show results for a data owners has as low as
1% of the total training dataset (60,000 images) corresponding
to 600 images, i.e. 60 images per digit. In the privGAN
architecture, we combine this data owner with another one
also with varying dataset size. We explore combinations of
data owners with various fractions from 1%-1% to 50%-50%1
and many in between such as 20%-10%, 8%-50%, etc. In our
bank analogy, this corresponds to various scenarios where the
two banks have different amounts of signatures to train their
synthetic generator.
A. Models and training
As for the original privGAN paper, we use standard fully
connected networks for both generators and discriminators
because MNIST is a relatively simple dataset. Identical
generator and discriminator architectures are used for both
GANs and privGANs. We train all the privGAN models
with Adam optimizer with learning rate of 0.0002 (β=0.5)
for 200 epochs. We use the same parameters for the GAN
models except for 250 epochs. Following the procedure of the
original paper, we run a model for each digit in order to have
a label for each sample. As mentioned before, contrary to
the original privGAN method, we do not pre-train the central
discriminator DP on real images. It is not expected to have a
significant impact as this pre-training was only implemented
to speed up the convergence in the original privGAN paper.
While evaluating the performance on downstream classifica-
tion tasks, we train all GAN models with an Adam optimizer
with a learning rate of 0.0002 (β=0.5) for 25 epochs over
3000 generated samples2. In all cases, we use batch size of
256 samples.
1We make the maximum data in a privGAN subset to be 50% of the dataset
which is more than enough to reach very high utility.
2When evaluating privGAN generated samples from both generators, the
evaluation is still performed on 3000 samples, 1500 from each generators.
B. Membership inference attacks
To evaluate the privacy vulnerability of a model and its
generated data, we apply membership attacks on the discrim-
inators, the most vulnerable elements of the architecture. The
white-box attacks on the simple GANs are outlined in [20]
where it is assumed that the adversary is in possession of
the trained model along with a large data pool including the
training samples. The attacker is also assumed to have the
knowledge of what fraction of the dataset was used for train-
ing, f . The attack then proceeds by using the discriminator of
the trained GAN to obtain a probability score for each sample
in the dataset. The samples are then sorted in descending order
of probability score and the top f fraction of the scores are
predicted as the likely training set. The evaluation of the white-
box attack is done by calculating what fraction of the predicted
training set was actually in the training set.
In our bank example, a successful membership inference
attack would trace back clients to their bank, an information
to be kept private. It makes the reasonable assumption that
the adversary has access to clients’ signatures which can
come from many sources (e.g. contracts or petitions signed
by the client).
Since our privGAN models have two generatordiscrimina-
tor pairs, the previously described attack cannot be directly
applied to it. However, for a successful whitebox attack, each
of the discriminators should score samples from the training
corpus higher than those not used in training. The privGAN
authors modified the previous approach by identifying a max
probability score by taking the max over the scores from
all discriminators. The rationale being that the discriminator
which has trained on a particular data sample should have
the largest discriminator score. We now proceed to sort the
samples by each of these aggregate scores and select the top
f fraction samples as the predicted training set. As a sanity
check, we also include the mean probability score in our
results.
V. RESULTS
We first look at the generated images from a GAN and
privGAN trained on various training set sizes in Fig. 4. One
can see that for small training data (4%-5% of the training
set), GANs are just creating noise. PrivGAN on the other
hand, does create recognizable digits even when the other
subset is also small (shown at 4% in the figure). We also
note that when a data owner has a large amount of data,
privGAN makes the image noisier than what a simple GAN
would generate. This is not necessary a bad thing, it can be
interpreted as a sign of privacy. Indeed, going back to our
bank analogy, a noisier synthetic signature is harder to link to
any real signature from the bank’s clients. We will see below
that this privacy comes at a low cost in utility for synthetic
samples created with privGAN.
We then explore the effect on the utility of an unequal
amount of data on each data owners. The subsets are i.i.d.
Fig. 4: Generated images with GANs (left column) and priv-
GAN’s generator 1 (other columns). The rows corresponds to
the fraction of the training data accessible locally. For the
GAN, this correspond to the total training data size and for
privGAN, this corresponds to the subsets Xreal1 . Column 2,3,4
correspond to the data size of the other data owner, Xreal2 .
samples of different sizes from the parent training population
so the data distributions are the same, only the subset sizes
vary. Fig. 5 shows the classification accuracy of a model
trained separately on each local synthetic dataset and their
union. For reference, the point 50%-50% on the most top right
of Fig. 5a correspond to the original privGAN paper where the
whole training set was used. We note that, for the privGAN ar-
chitecture, the data owners are interchangeable which translate
in the symmetry along a bottom-left to top-right line which is
reasonably respected within some fluctuations. For example,
the accuracy at 10%-50% should be the same as 50%-10%.
We further note that the utility remains high for both synthetic
datasets as long as one has sufficiently enough training data.
This can be seen at the lower-right and upper-left sections of
Fig. 5b.
Fig. 6 compares the same accuracies with those for the
same classifier trained on synthetic samples from a local
GAN. We first notice that at some threshold (5%), GAN
produce synthetic data with essentially no utility: the classifier
accuracy is close to random guessing. This corresponds to
GAN generating noise as noted in Fig. 4. This does not
happen for privGAN, there is always a minimal utility
observed in our exploration. Clearly, privGAN is beneficial
when data owners have small datasets size even if the other
data owner has small data size too. For the bank analogy,
this means that banks can help each others in building better
signature classification models even when they have few
signatures. As the available training data size increase, all
utilities converge slightly below the GAN utility. Indeed,
when the subset reaches the size of 40%, there is no utility
gain from the privGAN architecture (although we will see
(a) Trained on samples from both generators
(b) Trained on samples from generator 1 (left) and 2 (right)
Fig. 5: Accuracy (as color) of a classification model trained on
privGAN synthetic data. All figures share the same color code.
The vertical and horizontal axes correspond to the fraction of
data available for training the generator-discriminator pair.
The fraction is w.r.t. the full training set for each digit,
i.e. 100% = 10,000 training samples per digit. The black
points correspond to actual accuracies and the color filling
between the points are interpolations. Note the log scale on
the horizontal and vertical axes.
below there is still a privacy benefit). There is always a subset
size threshold, depending on the other data owner subset
size, below which privGAN becomes beneficial in utility. For
example, when the other data owner has as a 25% subset size,
privGAN becomes beneficial for subsets size below roughly
20%.
Fig. 7 shows the accuracies of white-box attacks on the
discriminators. It shows that privGAN’s discriminators are
very secure since the attack successes are always close to
random guessing while GANs’ vulnerability increase as func-
Fig. 6: Accuracy of a classification model trained on privGAN
and GAN synthetic data. The privGAN synthetic data is
comprised of samples from generator 1 only. The horizontal
axes correspond to the fraction of the training sample subset
used for training the privGAN generator-discriminator pair
while keeping the other subset size fixed.
Fig. 7: White-box attack accuracies as function of fraction of
training data used for training privGAN. Here, both subsets
have the same fraction of the data, so 100% corresponds to
each subset having 50% of the full training data set. The
attacks are performed with 200 training samples combined
with the X (approx 1000) hold out from the given digit which
makes the random guessing at 0.2. All privGAN attacks are
close to random guessing while most GAN results are above
and increasing with data fraction.
tion of training samples. PrivGAN privacy can also be seen in
Fig. 8 where the discriminator’s confidences on the training
set is very similar to the confidence on the holdout set. For
the GAN, on the other hand, we can see a clear distinction
between the confidence on the training set and the holdout
set. This is the vulnerability exploited by the white-box attack.
We also see from the GAN confidence distributions, that the
confidence decreases on the training set as the training set size
decreases. This is the opposite for the holdout set such that
both confidence distributions overlap for small training set size
making the synthetic data more private as was shown in Fig.
7.
For the bank analogy, this means that an adversary cannot
confidently match a bank clients’ signatures with its bank by
Fig. 8: Digit 0 discriminator distributions. The rows corre-
spond to subsets fraction = 100%, 50% & 20% of the training
data, respectively. The columns correspond to the discrimi-
nator 1, discriminator 2 & GAN discriminator, respectively.
The red color corresponds to the discriminator probability on
its training data, the blue color corresponds to the hold out
data and the green color correspond to the training data of
the other discriminator (privGAN only). This shows how the
privGAN discriminators give similar probabilities for train
and test set, a characteristic of private models. For GANs,
there is a clear distinction of the distributions.
Fig. 9: Same as Fig. 8 but for digit 1. The GAN distributions
are very similar, a sign of privacy (see digit 1 in Fig. 7). This
distributions for GANs happens only for digit 1.
inspecting privGAN components. This is usually not the case
for the GANs.
We show the results of the first four digits to demonstrate
the particularity of digit 1 (the digits not shown have behaviour
similar to digits 0, 2 and 3). Indeed, we note that for digit 1,
the GAN discriminator happens to be private too. This can
also be seen by the discriminator distributions in Fig. 9 where
discriminator has a similar response on the training and test
samples. We hypothesise that digits 1s are inherently more
private because of their lower diversity, i.e. there are fewer
ways to draw 1s than there are for other digits. As a results,the
1s are more similar and harder to distinguish, hence they are
more private.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the utility of a synthetic dataset can
be significantly improved for data owners with small datasets
when information is shared through the privGAN architecture.
For example, if the data owner has too few data samples, a
simple GAN could not even generate recognizable synthetic
images while it was always possible with privGAN. We
have tested the most privacy-vulnerable components of the
privGAN architecture, the discriminators, and the membership
inference attacks are as good as random as opposes to basic
GAN synthetic data. If the data size is large enough, the ben-
efits, besides helping other data owners, are mainly the added
privacy to the synthetic data. Our results are encouraging
for enterprises wanting to collaborate by sharing information
while minimizing the privacy risks.
We have used a bank example as an application for the
privGAN method to preserve the clients privacy while sharing
information about their signatures. In this scenario, a bank
(or branch of a bank) could help another bank to generate a
synthetic signature dataset to train a better fraudulent signature
detection model while preserving their clients’ privacy. We
have shown that a bank with too few signatures cannot
generated any synthetic signatures on its own, but it becomes
possible with the help of another bank through the privGAN
architecture. Depending on the bank needs and privacy poli-
cies, it is possible to vary the trade-off between utility and
privacy. Thus, a Pareto front could be explored by modifying
certain elements of the privGAN architecture. For example, the
strength of central discriminator DP can be modified and will
affect both privacy and utility. It is also possible to change the
neural network model to, say, convolutional neural networks
which are more adapted to image processing than dense layer
networks used here. This modification might affect the privacy
vulnerability as it varies for different types of networks as
demonstrated in [21].
The original privGAN paper demonstrated the utility of
their methods on more complex datasets such as CIFAR10.
Although it remains to be shown, it is reasonable to assume
that our conclusion would also hold with more complex
datasets and other data types, within the known limitations
of simple GANs.
As for further work, we are exploring the benefits when
the data owners have non-i.i.d. subsets. For example, the
signatures could come from clients of different age, gender or
any other population parameter that could influence signatures.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We are grateful to the privGAN authors Sumit Mukherjee,
Yixi Xu, Anusua Trivedi and Juan Lavista Ferres for fruitful
discussions and granting access to their code.
REFERENCES
[1] H. B. McMahan, E. Moore, D. Ramage, S. Hampson, and B. A. y Arcas,
“Communication-efficient learning of deep networks from decentralized
data,” 2016.
[2] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu, D. Warde-Farley,
S. Ozair, A. Courville, and Y. Bengio, “Generative adversarial nets,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 27, Z. Ghahramani,
M. Welling, C. Cortes, N. D. Lawrence, and K. Q. Weinberger, Eds.
Curran Associates, Inc., 2014, pp. 2672–2680. [Online]. Available:
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/5423-generative-adversarial-nets.pdf
[3] S. Augenstein, H. B. McMahan, D. Ramage, S. Ramaswamy, P. Kairouz,
M. Chen, R. Mathews, and B. A. y Arcas, “Generative models for
effective ml on private, decentralized datasets,” 2019.
[4] C. Hardy, E. L. Merrer, and B. Sericola, “Md-gan: Multi-discriminator
generative adversarial networks for distributed datasets,” 2018.
[5] M. Rasouli, T. Sun, and R. Rajagopal, “Fedgan: Federated generative
adversarial networks for distributed data,” 2020.
[6] S. Mukherjee, Y. Xu, A. Trivedi, and J. L. Ferres, “privgan: Protecting
gans from membership inference attacks at low cost,” 2019.
[7] C. Dwork and A. Roth, “The algorithmic foundations of differential
privacy,” Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci., vol. 9, no. 34, p. 211407,
Aug. 2014. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000042
[8] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan, I. Mironov,
K. Talwar, and L. Zhang, “Deep learning with differential privacy,”
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, Oct 2016. [Online]. Available: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978318
[9] L. Xie, K. Lin, S. Wang, F. Wang, and J. Zhou, “Differentially private
generative adversarial network,” 2018.
[10] N. Papernot, M. Abadi, lfar Erlingsson, I. Goodfellow, and K. Talwar,
“Semi-supervised knowledge transfer for deep learning from private
training data,” 2016.
[11] J. Yoon, J. Jordon, and M. van der Schaar, “PATE-GAN: Generating
synthetic data with differential privacy guarantees,” in International
Conference on Learning Representations, 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://openreview.net/forum?id=S1zk9iRqF7
[12] M. Neunhoeffer, Z. S. Wu, and C. Dwork, “Private post-gan boosting,”
2020.
[13] C. Fan and P. Liu, “Federated generative adversarial learning,” 2020.
[14] J. Hayes, L. Melis, G. Danezis, and E. D. Cristofaro, “LOGAN:
evaluating privacy leakage of generative models using generative
adversarial networks,” CoRR, vol. abs/1705.07663, 2017. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07663
[15] R. C. Geyer, T. Klein, and M. Nabi, “Differentially private federated
learning: A client level perspective,” 2017.
[16] D. Chen, T. Orekondy, and M. Fritz, “Gs-wgan: A gradient-sanitized
approach for learning differentially private generators,” 2020.
[17] H. B. McMahan, D. Ramage, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang, “Learning
differentially private recurrent language models,” 2017.
[18] A. Triastcyn and B. Faltings, “Federated generative privacy,” 2019.
[19] Y. LeCun, C. Cortes, and C. Burges, “Mnist handwritten digit database,”
ATT Labs [Online]. Available: http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist, vol. 2,
2010.
[20] J. Hayes, L. Melis, G. Danezis, and E. D. Cristofaro, “Logan: Member-
ship inference attacks against generative models,” 2017.
[21] D. Chen, N. Yu, Y. Zhang, and M. Fritz, “Gan-leaks: A taxonomy of
membership inference attacks against generative models,” 2019.
